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Two central views about biology remain deeply entrenched in popular thought. The 
first is a picture of evolution.  This is a set of ideas that reached their canonical form 
in the mid-twentieth century, as the so-called New Synthesis of Darwinism and 
Mendelism, and a version of which has become widely known due to the exceptional  
popularising talents of Richard Dawkins.  This is the view that evolution largely 
consists in small changes to genes, or to the human genome, which because of a small 
but incrementally advantageous change that they produce in the organism, gradually 
spread through the population.  Large scale evolution is just the accumulation of these 
small genetic changes over very long periods of time.  The second view concerns the 
centrality of the gene, or the genome.  Often referred to as genetic determinism, this is 
the view that sees the fundamental nature of organisms as inscribed in their genomes.   
 
These two doctrines fit together in an obvious way, and lead to the conclusion that if 
we can understand sufficiently well the evolutionary process that led to the particular 
genome of a particular organism, we will understand the essential nature of that 
organism.  And these views also underlie a great deal of popular writing claiming to 
derive gender roles from biological theory, with the regrettable implication that 
gender is somehow inscribed in our genes and that changes in gender roles will, 
therefore, be difficult or impossible to bring about.  The central point of the present 
paper will be to explain how contemporary biological thought has in fact moved far 
beyond these familiar theses, and that more up to date understandings provide no 
support for such genetic deterministic perspectives on human behaviour in general, or 
gendered differences in behaviour in particular. 
 
Are the differences between men and women to be explained by biology or by 
society?  Just about everything is wrong with this question.  Most obviously, it 
presupposes that there is a reasonably reliable and well-defined set of differences 
between the human sexes in the first place, which is at least a central point at issue; 
and second it assumes, if not that any human feature is either biologically or socially 
caused, at least that we can partition causes between factors of these sorts.  Both these 
assumptions are, at best, controversial.  My positive thesis, an increasingly 
uncontroversial one among those who have familiarised themselves with the 
theoretical background, is that every human feature develops through an interaction 
between biological and environmental, often social, causes, so that both biology and 
the environment, again typically the social environment, are involved in almost all 
human traits of interest (see, e.g., Lewontin 2000).  This does not show that any 
desired change in behaviour can be brought about at will, a view sometimes attributed 
to critics of biological determinism (Pinker, 2002) but, as I shall explain, it shows that 
we should be highly sceptical about suggestions that limits to human behavioural 
possibility are deeply engrained in our biology.  A fortiori, we should be sceptical of 
such claims as applied to gender-related differences. 
 
The most widely disseminated contemporary attempt to ground human sex 
differences, and thereby gender differences, in biology is Evolutionary Psychology.  
Following a growing convention, I capitalise Evolutionary Psychology to refer to a 
particular set of views on the evolution of human psychology associated particularly 
with writers such as Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, Steven Pinker, and David Buss. 
In criticising these views I do not, of course, mean to deny that our psychology 
evolved, since I assume that we evolved, and therefore our psychology did too.  
Evolutionary Psychologists, in this narrower sense, offer an atavistic view of human 
psychology, in which contemporary human behaviour is to be explained by appeal to 
its aptness for reproductive success in the Pleistocene, or late Stone Age.  The means 
by which Stone Age traits are supposed to have descended to modern humans is that 
they were carried here in our genes.  Hence this school of thought presupposes and 
lends credence to the idea that sexual dimorphism of behaviour is genetically caused.   
 
A quite different line of investigation about which I shall say much less is behavioural 
genetics.  Behavioural geneticists investigate contemporary humans and typically 
attempt to measure the heritability of behavioural traits.  ‘Heritability’ is a highly 
technical term, generally taken to be a statistical measure of the extent to which the 
explanation of the variation in a trait is to be attributed to differences in genes, and is 
expressed as a number in the range 0-1.  The interpretation of heritability is highly 
controversial.  A sense of the difficulty the concept presents can be gained by noting 
that the heritability of a trait is necessarily zero for a genetically homogeneous 
population and necessarily 1 for a population in a uniform environment.  Hence the 
impression too frequently given when heritabilities are reported, that they measure 
some intrinsic feature of the aetiology of a trait, is clearly mistaken.  Of course this 
hardly constitutes an argument that the concept is misguided, and in fact it is a 
perfectly respectable and useful concept, for example in fields such as crop breeding.  
It does, however, point to the potential for the concept to mislead, and to the fact that 
it most certainly does not provide the identification of the causation of behavioural 
traits sometimes misattributed to it.  For a properly detailed critique of human 
behavioural genetics, see Kaplan (2000). 
 
Although human development, the process through which mature human traits 
emerge, is a very complex causal process, certainly some of the causal factors 
involved are properly described as biological. I shall begin the substantive discussion 
of this paper, therefore, by saying something about biological causes and more 
specifically genetic causes.  I want here to highlight the diversity and complexity of 
even purely biological causes, and the divergence between contemporary biology and 
the way genetic causation is often thought of outside professional biological circles.  
This will prepare the way for seeing how the basic argumentative strategy of 
Evolutionary Psychology, and specifically its application to gender difference, is 
entirely out of touch with contemporary biology. 
 
 
Genes as Causes of Behaviour. 
 
A simple picture, widely promoted and perhaps widely believed, sees genes as the 
causes of features of the human brain which, in turn, cause people to behave in certain 
ways.  Of course, a sufficiently rarified sense of ‘cause’ may very well make this true.  
No doubt genetic factors play an essential part in human development: if there were 
no genes there would certainly be no brain.  But equally if there were no food, or too 
many tigers, or countless other internal and external contributors, positive and 
negative, to development, there would be no brain.  This is hardly enough to capture 
what the proponent of genetic causation has in mind.   
 
So what is the genetic contribution to development that some see as so special?  The 
biological function for which genes are best known is the provision of templates for 
the production of proteins.  Proteins are the most important structural molecules in 
humans as in other organisms, and many proteins are essential to the structure and 
function of the brain.  So it is at once easy to see the necessity of genes in the 
development of the brain.  However, we should also note that this is a surprisingly 
low level function to be taken as the most important in determining the fine structure 
of the brain that, in turn, determines the specifics of behaviour.  This is especially so 
when we realise that the full set of genes does not determine precisely which proteins 
are produced in any particular cell, something that is obvious when we consider the 
great diversity of structure and function found in the many different cell types in the 
human body—liver cells, muscle cells, blood cells, nerve cells, and so on—all of 
which share, more or less, exactly the same complement of genes.  As a matter of fact 
it is increasingly clear that the genome has the potential to produce a vast diversity of 
different sets of proteins (and of RNAs, the molecules that are intermediaries in the 
process of protein production).  A variety of quite well understood mechanisms are 
now recognised that enable a particular gene to produce a whole range of different 
protein products
1
.   
 
It was once thought, and perhaps still is by some, that an additional function of the 
genome was the regulation of the activities of the genome so that as well as providing 
the templates for proteins the genome also somehow determined which proteins were 
produced and where.  This is the idea encapsulated in the idea of a genetic 
programme, an idea that maintains a vision of the entire organism somehow encoded 
in the genome.  However, it is now recognised that the factors that determine the 
activity of the genome are much more varied than this picture proposes.  The genome 
is a dynamic entity, in constant interaction with other chemical constituents in the 
cell.  Other molecules bind to the genome, changing its physical configuration, and 
influencing which parts of the sequence are transcribed at any moment.  It might be 
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 An elementary survey of these mechanisms, as well as of much of the biological material sketched in 
this paper, can be found in Barnes and Dupré 2008. 
imagined that the presence of these other molecules, mainly RNAs and proteins, was 
itself determined by the genome, and therefore that they were merely part of the 
system by which the genome regulates itself.  There are two reasons for rejecting this 
view, both of which are fundamental in providing a more defensible view of the role 
of the genome in biology. 
 
First, there is no point in the life cycle at which the DNA starts de novo to populate 
the cell. DNA is always found in complex cellular environments with which it is in 
dynamic interaction.  It is sometimes suggested that multicellular organisms reach a 
bottleneck in the production of the fertilised egg, or zygote, at which there is nothing 
but DNA to carry developmental information to the next generation.  Thus evolution 
is seen as a long sequence of genomes, each of which tests the organism for which it 
is a blueprint against the demands of natural selection.  But the reality is that 
evolution consists of a sequence of cell divisions, and the full chemical complement 
of the cell is involved in the process of cell division.  The evolutionary history which 
informs the development of the organism is not merely the static information 
deposited in DNA sequence, but the dynamic chemistry of a sequence of cells 
stretching back into deep pre-history.  The (relative) stability of biological forms has 
been maintained by a continuously dynamic sequence of molecular equilibria, not by 
a static object somehow embodying all the information necessary to recreate such 
forms.   
 
Second, the chemistry of the cell can be affected, all the way to the genome, by 
environmental influences on the organism.  Cellular influences on the genome are 
studied generally in the burgeoning field of epigenetics. The epigenetic phenomenon 
which has been most thoroughly studied in this context, though it is by no means the 
only one, is methylation.  This is a modification of one of the bases in the DNA 
sequence, cytosine, in which a hydrogen atom is replaced by a methyl group (CH3), 
and converted to 5-methyl-cytosine.  This can either suppress or enhance the 
expression of the gene in which the modification occurs.  It used to be thought that 
this process was always reversed during the formation of sex cells, so that these 
effects were limited to the lifetime of an organism.  But it is now clear that this is not 
the case, and that not only is the methylation state of the genome influenced by 
environmental effects up to and including the interaction of the whole organism with 
its environment, but that these can be passed on to offspring, so that the environment 
can affect the evolution of a lineage through this mechanism.  (If anyone suspects that 
the bogey of Lamarckism is here rearing its ugly head, they are quite right.)  
However, direct reproductive transmission of methylation patterns is not essential for 
these to be stabilised in a lineage.  A famous example is the effect on infant rats of 
maternal care including especially genital licking.  This has a range of effects on the 
behavioural development of the rat pups, some at least of which have been shown to 
be mediated by methylation of genes in brain cells.  Rat pups deprived of proper 
genital licking become more generally fearful and maladjusted in various aspects of 
sexual and maternal behaviour (Weaver et al. 2004).  One likely consequence is that 
female rats so deprived will be less likely to provide proper genital licking to their 
pups, so that this genetic, or technically epigenetic, change, could be transmitted by a 
mechanism that passes through the maternal behaviour. 
 
Humans, of course, are subject to similar processes.  These have been extensively 
studied by Marcus Pembrey and his colleagues in the longitudinal ALSPAC study at 
Bristol University, who have discovered various transgenerational effects of maternal 
nutrition on several generations of offspring.  This has long been suspected in the case 
of the wartime famine in the Netherlands, which appears to have produced not only 
low birth-weight babies for the generation that experienced the famine, but also for 
their well-nourished children. One important recent result, extending the phenomenon 
to paternal as well as maternal influences, has been a report of the effect of very early 
onset of smoking (up to 11 years of age) by fathers, which tends to produce obesity in 
male, but not female, children (Pembrey et al., 2005).  Induced changes in 
methylation patterns appear to be involved in these effects.   
 
The point of all this is not to suggest that behaviour determined by epigenetics is 
somehow undisturbing in a way that genetically determined behaviour is not.  The 
point is rather to revise the ideas about genetics which, together with the view of 
evolution to which I shall next turn, have been central to the tradition of simplistic 
biological explanations of behaviour, of which Evolutionary Psychology is merely the 
latest example.  The assumption of the centrality of the genome mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper is well summarised by the so-called Central Dogma of 
Molecular Biology, a thesis first expounded by Francis Crick (1958).  Whether or not 
this was intended with a measure of irony, as the selection of the term ‘dogma’ might 
suggest, it has been taken very seriously by many later commentators.  What the 
Central Dogma asserts is that information flows in one direction only, from DNA to 
RNA to proteins.  The epigenetic phenomena that I have just mentioned are just one 
central respect in which this dogma can now be seen wholly misguided.  As I have 
said, the genome, and the DNA it contains is in constant interaction with other 
molecules and structures in the cell, and the cell is in interaction with other 
components of the organism.  Causal influences run up and down between structures 




The other idea mentioned at the beginning of this paper is a view of evolution.  As 
presented and widely popularised by Richard Dawkins (1976, and numerous later 
works) this is a vision of evolution as fundamentally consisting of a long sequence of 
genomes stretching into the deepest past.  This fits perfectly with the second idea, the 
centrality of the genome, as each of these genomes is seen as carrying the information 
necessary to construct the organism that will actually confront the world of natural 
selection.  The failure of the Central Dogma to survive recent scientific insights 
should already raise suspicions about the viability of this picture of evolution, but in 
this section I shall confront it more directly. 
 
It has frequently been noted that the view of evolution to which I have just alluded, as 
a sequence of genomes each providing the blueprint or code for an organism, makes 
possible the complete exclusion from evolutionary theory of the process of 
development, the process through which the fertilised egg becomes a mature adult.  
This omission has been the central concern of one important counter-trend in 
evolutionary biology, evolutionary developmental biology, or evo-devo (see, e.g. Raff 
1996; Carroll 2005).  Evo-devo has stressed that what most fundamentally evolves in 
multicellular organisms such as ourselves is the developmental process itself, and this, 
as I have been stressing is something that involves much more than a set of 
information encoded in the genome.  Complementary to evo-devo, though 
occasionally accused of being a ‘merely’ philosophical critique of orthodox 
evolutionary theory, is developmental systems theory (DST) (Oyama et al. 2001).  
DST sees the fundamental units of evolution as life cycles, and looks at the 
reproduction of life cycles as involving a whole nexus of developmental resources 
that are provided by ancestral organisms to promote the development of descendant 
organisms.  Such resources include, of course, the genome and its enclosing cell and 
epigenetic inheritance, but also parental behaviour, and a wide range of environmental 
modifications that organisms make to provide circumstances that favour the 
successful development of their offspring.   
 
Here I should also mention another very important though more orthodox 
enhancement of evolutionary theory in recent years, which has obvious affinities with 
DST, the idea of niche construction (Odling-Smee et al. 2003).  The phenomenon was 
beautifully documented by Charles Darwin (1882), in his classic investigation of the 
way that earthworms transform the soil in which they live, and do so in ways that 
produce an environment in which they thrive.  Everyone is familiar with the 
construction of dams by beavers, nests by many species of birds, and complex hives 
or mounds by the social Hymenoptera or by termites.  It is obvious in all these cases 
that organisms modify their environments in complex ways that are essential features 
of the processes through which they survive and reproduce, and it is increasingly 
recognised that this is a quite typical aspect of biological evolution.  From the 
perspective of DST, such modifications of the environment contribute important parts 
of the developmental nexus that facilitates the replication of life cycles. 
 
Humans have developed this aspect of the developmental process to an extent 
unprecedented in animal evolution.  Maternity wards in hospitals and schools are only 
the most obvious of the human institutions that provide essential aspects of the 
process by which humans are reproduced.  And of course it is the unique complexity 
and diversity of human behaviour that makes such environmental resources essential 
to successful human development.  No one, I suppose, imagines that there are genes 
that cause people to build schools.  One reason (of many) why this is an absurd notion 
is that most people never show the slightest inclination to build a school.  The serious 
point is that human societies exhibit an enormously elaborate division of labour.  And 
this division of labour is one of the things that schools, and many other related 
institutions, make possible.  Whereas the division of labour in insect colonies appears 
to be largely biologically determined, though the proportions of different types may 
be controlled by the present needs of the colony, nothing of the sort is true for 
humans.  Adam Smith (1776), who most influentially theorised the idea of the 
division labour, makes the point vividly: 
 
The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher 
and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from 
nature as from habit, custom, and education. When they came into the world, 
and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were perhaps very 
much alike, and neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any 
remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed 
in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken 
notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is 
willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance.  
 
It is a prerequisite for the possibility of such divergence in development that human 
biology allows for a great deal of behavioural flexibility.  In short, the transfer of 
developmental resources from internal to external is required by the complexity of 
human social arrangements.  But it is important to realise that as with so many human 
traits taken to be the distinguishing human excellence, this externalisation of 
developmental resources, though taken to a much greater degree than in any other 




Let me now return to Evolutionary Psychology.  Evolutionary Psychologists suppose 
that the basic human psychological repertoire consists of a set of specialised modules 
evolved to deal with the problems that confronted our ancestors in the Stone Age.  
Why the Stone Age?  The answer, at least in opposition to suggestions that much 
human behaviour is of more recent origin, is simply that they assume an antiquated 
model of evolutionary change according to which significant evolutionary change 
must take hundreds of thousands or millions of years.  This is a model according to 
which evolutionary change requires the selection over many generations of a series of 
incremental changes to the genome, each of which provides an incremental 
improvement in the adaptedness of the organism.  It is easy to see why this would be a 
slow process.  Humans have long generation times, and the spread of a perhaps only 
slightly advantageous mutation through the population may take many generations.  
Indeed it is easy to doubt whether a million years or so would be long enough for the 
evolution of entirely new psychological mechanisms.   
 
But, as I have very briefly explained, there is much more to evolution than this.  And 
we should not see the genome, especially in an organism as complex as the human, as 
a blueprint, but rather as an extremely large and flexible set of chemical resources.  
Organisms can come to use these resources in quite different ways, and this use can 
be stabilised through the creation of reliable cues or further resources in the 
environment.  Such a view of evolution has been developed in great detail and quite 
generally through the concept of phenotypic plasticity (West Eberhard 2003).  In the 
first place, as the name suggests, this view emphasises the great flexibility with which 
phenotypes respond in their development to variation in the environment.  It is also 
supposed that a repeatedly adaptive phenotypic response to the environment may be 
followed by a process of genetic accommodation, in which the adaptive response 
gradually comes to constitute the default output of the genome. This idea is generally 
known as the Baldwin Effect, having been proposed as early as 1896 by the American 
psychologist James Mark Baldwin.  When these insights are combined with an 
awareness of the extent of external developmental resources constructed by 
contemporary humans, models of the spread of genetic variations derived from 
classical population genetics become wholly irrelevant to understanding 
contemporary human behaviour.  The idea that humans are properly adapted to life in 
the Stone Age, but somehow survive in the very different environment of the modern 
city, seems rather remarkable given that we are surely the most successful large 
animals currently on the planet—indeed, we’ve killed off most of the others.  
Fortunately there is no reason whatever to believe it.   
 
So what should we make of the conclusions about gendered difference so successfully 
disseminated by Evolutionary Psychologists (Buss 1994; Geary 1998) and earlier by 
Sociobiologists?  As almost everyone knows, their central dogmas are based on an 
exploration of the differences in evolutionary costs and benefits deriving from 
different reproductive strategies for males and females.  The core premise is that the 
possible reproductive success of males is much higher, sperm being cheap and 
plentiful, while eggs are larger and more expensive to produce.  Added to the fact that 
females generally invest considerable resources in gestation and care of infants, the 
overall female contribution to the cooperative enterprise is much more significant and 
valuable than that of the male.  On this basis, males are predicted to attempt to spread 
their seed as widely as possible, while females are predicted to try to get maximum 
value for their scarce resource, either by securing a male partner who will contribute 
to childcare, or by finding the male with the best possible genes.  A more 
Machiavellian scenario suggests that with a bit of deceit they may manage both, 
which suggests in turn that the child-rearing male will be keeping a close eye on his 
partner and will have a low tolerance for any extramarital sex on her part.   
 
I have criticised the standard elaboration of these ideas for human evolution in detail 
elsewhere (2001a; 2001b), and I shall not repeat this exercise here. For now I want to 
make some more general points.  First, the core argument that I have just sketched is a 
quite general one, applying to any sexual species in which a considerable amount of 
pre- or post-natal investment is required by the female for reproduction.  I do not 
doubt that it has wide relevance for understanding a lot of natural history.  There are 
many species in which the most successful males appear to monopolise much of the 
attention of the females; sometimes this can lead to otherwise maladaptive marks 
taken by females as measures of male fitness being hugely developed by processes of 
sexual selection.  Highly ornate birds such as peacocks, and huge and aggressive 
elephant seals are standard exemplars of such sexual systems.  The Irish Elk is 
hypothesised to have driven itself to extinction by excessive sexual selection of the 
massive antlers of the male, which eventually perhaps dragged it forever into the bog.  
Many more birds pursue cooperative child-rearing strategies, and here careful 
observation also suggests that females often pursue the Machiavellian strategy alluded 
to above, and males do indeed appear to spend a great deal of time spying on their 
mates in an attempt to prevent this.   
 
So what does this tell us about humans?  The Evolutionary Psychologists’ project is to 
consider the so-called environment of evolutionary adaptation, the Pleistocene, and 
infer which variant of these familiar sexual mating systems is likely to have evolved 
for humans.  Given the rather limited information we have about the environmental 
conditions that faced humans a million years ago, let alone about their social and 
sexual mores, this is a difficult task, but there is no shortage of theorists willing to 
imagine sometimes Flintstonian scenarios relevant to its solution.  One might well 
wonder why it would not be more useful to investigate empirically the actual sexual 
behaviour exhibited by modern humans.  It is true that having constructed their 
atavistic hypotheses, Evolutionary Psychologists do sometimes engage in such 
empirical work (e.g. Buss 1994).  The problem is that they find that sexual behaviour 
is both interculturally and intraculturally highly variable.  So, armed with their Stone 
Age hypotheses, the goal is to find the underlying universal tendencies somehow 
concealed by the vagaries of human history and culture.  There is clearly a sense that 
this underlying biological reality, rather than mere empirical behaviour, is what is 
important.   
 
We should remember that despite occasional impressions to the contrary that may be 
gleaned from Evolutionary Psychological writings, much of the behaviour we are 
considering is far more ancient than Stone Age humans.  Female concerns with care 
of their young and male interests in contributing at least their genes to the 
reproductive process can certainly be traced to much more distant non-human 
ancestors.  The point of recalling this point is to insist that, contrary to the suggestion 
most notoriously propagated by Steven Pinker, to reject of the Evolutionary 
Psychologists’ world view is not to embrace the so-called Blank Slate view of human 
nature according to which culture can write whatever it chooses on an entirely 
formless human mind.  Quite general evolutionary considerations may lead us to 
suspect that maternal care, a tendency to male promiscuity, and very likely a 
somewhat more focused female tendency to promiscuity, may be features of human 
development that will emerge under a wide range of circumstances.   
 
The crucial point, however, is that whatever these deep tendencies, actual empirical 
observation of both our primate relatives and the diversity of human societies reveals 
enormous diversity in the relations between the sexes.  And once we escape the 
outdated and limited view of evolution that precludes any real change except over 
aeons of time, this diversity can be taken at face value, and as clear evidence of the 
flexibility of human sex/gender systems.  Among non-human primates we can find 
highly promiscuous species such as our own closest relatives the chimpanzees and 
even more strikingly the Bonobos; the Hamadryas Baboon lives in large groups 
characterised by moderate polygyny; many species of gibbon appear to be largely 
monogamous; and Capuchin monkeys live in large groups with a dominant male with 
pre-eminent sexual access to females; and so on.  In the case of humans, numerous 
cultural anthropologists have documented the diversity of human sexual behaviour 
and human gender roles, and feminist historians have documented the changes in 
these aspects of human life in both recent and distant history.  Human behaviour, 
including the behaviour that is differentiated by sex and gender, is extremely flexible 
and humans can develop in many different ways.  As I mentioned earlier such 
flexibility is indeed a prerequisite for the complex and variable division of labour that 
is also a unique and distinctive feature of human life.  To repeat, this does not mean 
that the human mind is a Blank Slate, nor that it is a trivial matter to shape human 
behaviour in particular desired directions.  It does mean that there are no simple 
biological limits to human possibility, and that gender differences are much better 
studied by detailed exploration of their actual present and historical manifestations 
than by futile speculations about life in the Stone Age. 
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